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Do Blockchain Technologies Make Us 
Safer? Do Cryptocurrencies Necessarily 
Make Us Less Safe? 
SARAH JANE HUGHES* 
Abstract 
This essay is based on a presentation made on January 24, 2020 at the invitation of the Texas 
Journal of International Law and the Strauss Center for National Security at the University 
of Texas.  That presentation focused on the two questions mentioned in the title of this essay 
– Do Blockchain Technologies Make Us Safer?  And Do Cryptocurrencies Necessarily Make 
Us Less Safe? The essay presents answers to the two questions: “yes” and “probably yes.” 
This essay begins with some level-setting on different types of blockchain technologies and 
of cryptocurrencies, and gives  some background materials on global and national responses 
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Escalations in the tensions around the world and recent cyberwarfare incidents against 
agencies, businesses, and infrastructure in the United States bring new attention to the 
adoption of blockchain technologies and cryptocurrencies. Additionally, plans announced by 
Facebook, the Russian Federation, and China to issue new cryptocurrencies add new urgency 
to discussion of issues related to the increasingly wider adoptions of cryptocurrencies, 
including government-issued digital currencies (“central bank digital currencies” or 
“CBDCs”).  Questions about “El Petro”, the cryptocurrency sponsored by the Maduro 
government in Venezuela and backed by the reserves of the state-owned oil company, raise 
additional issues. National and regional governments, such as the United States and the 
European Union, and inter-governmental organizations, such as the Financial Action Task 
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Force (FATF), have aimed initiatives at the uses of cryptocurrencies to limit their use for 
laundering monies or financing terrorism.  
This essay will offer thoughts on topics intersecting national security and these two 
emerging technologies – blockchain and cryptocurrencies.  Foremost among these topics are:  
(1) Are blockchain technologies able to make us safer? and,  
(2) Do some or all cryptocurrencies necessarily make us less safe?  
Generally speaking, the answer to both questions is “yes.” However, the reasons for 
each differ significantly. The first question is far easier to answer than the second.  
This essay will address both the two basic questions and the two pairs of subsidiary 
questions. This essay also attempts to tie issues surrounding blockchain and cryptocurrencies 
to international law and national security by discussing two laws that pose challenges to 
international law and to national security law. To address these questions, this essay first 
engages in some level-setting for blockchain and cryptocurrencies.  The conclusion will set 
out subjects for additional research and offer final thoughts on the introductory questions.  
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND 
CRYPTOCURRENCY 
The terms “blockchain” and “cryptocurrency” have been around long enough that some 
of us think we know something about each term.  For the purposes of this essay, I want to 
make clear how I am using these terms, and I invite readers’ comments in response. Readers 
familiar with this subject matter may wish to move on the sections dealing with the two broad 
questions posed above.  
A. Blockchain 
In this article, I use the term “blockchain” to refer to permissionless, decentralized 
public distributed ledgers—engaging all four of these concepts as prerequisites to the 
observations I want to make.  First, the term “permissionless” describes blockchains like the 
blockchain that is the authoritative ledger for Bitcoin.  
In simplified terms, a blockchain is a method of storing records of ownership or of assets 
and transactions which uses a version of a distributed ledger.1 A distributed ledger keeps 
records “in many different locations simultaneously.”2 Distributed ledgers theoretically are 
auditable, verifiable, and transparent.3  
No one needs “permission” to have an interest or transfer of interest recorded on the 
Bitcoin blockchain.  A user needs instead to create bitcoins through a problem-solving 
process known as “mining,” which results in the new bitcoin being reflected on the block.  
Others who earn bitcoins by performing transfer verification services for the Bitcoin 
blockchain or who purchase or acquire bitcoins from others do not require anyone’s advance 
permission to participate.4 None of us would need permission from anyone except a miner or 
 
 1.   ARTEMIS CARO, BLOCKCHAIN: THE BEGINNERS GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND 
BITCOIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY 12 (2018). 
 2.   Id. 
 3.   Id. 
 4.   Arnold Daniels, Permissionless Private Blockchains, LTO NETWORK (Sep. 26, 2019), 
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a counterparty in another transaction to acquire a bitcoin; none of us would need permission 
to mine a bitcoin—we’d just need the mental, computational, and, in the case of proof-of-
work generation, an energy supply fit for the job.  Alternatively, one could acquire the funds 
to buy a bitcoin from a previously recognized owner. 
Second, the Bitcoin blockchain is decentralized, which means that no one person, 
government (yet), or other legal entity is in charge.5  Rather, as noted above, a group of miners 
acting as the verification and registry team are in charge.   
Third, the term “public” is distinct from “private” or fully anonymous in this context 
because of the chain of transfers that are viewable in a “public” blockchain.6  Bitcoin is a 
public system: it operates through addresses and nodes. In the basic Bitcoin regime, individual 
transfers can be associated with prior transactions by tracking backwards through the pseudo-
anonymous addresses that the chain reveals.7 The blocks are open-to-view even if no “names” 
in the traditional sense are associated with the property registered on the block. 
The chain of blocks  that track the sequence of transactions for cryptocurrencies provide 
a unique opportunity for public analysis of transaction patterns and deterrence of double-
spending.8  Although the nominal identity of each person is not recorded as a human name or 
by a common identification value like a Social Security number, the public key used to sign 
the transaction can provide much of the same value.9 All of the transactions associated with 
the key of a particular person are easy to find on the blockchain in the publicly accessible 
information.10  Even if the transactions are routed through different exchanges or 
intermediaries, all of the cryptocoins that flow through the wallet can be flagged.11 
The ability to review and essentially trace transfers back to the time of the creation of a 
bitcoin facilitates identification not just of transfers, but of the actors involved.12 To 
demonstrate how open-to-view Bitcoin transactions are, in 2018 the Treasury’s Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) placed two Iranian intermediaries and their identified 
blockchain addresses on OFAC’s “Specially Designated Nationals” list.13 The selected actors 
had been identified by name as being associated with laundering proceeds from the Sam-Sam 
ransomware attacks.14  
“Distributed ledger” refers, in the first instance, to the manner that proposed 
entries/transactions are verified before being entered on the Bitcoin blockchain.15  The 
 
https://blog.ltonetwork.com/permissionless-private-blockchains-lto-network/ (last updated Dec. 23, 2019). 
 5.   White Paper, Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 4 (2008) 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [hereinafter Bitcoin White Paper]. 
 6.   PETER WAYNER, DIGITAL CASH: COMMERCE ON THE NET 2 (2d ed. 1997). 
 7.   Sarah Meiklejohn et al., A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with No Names, 
USENIX 128 (Dec. 2013), https://www.usenix.org/publications/login 
/december-2013-volume-38-number-6/fistful-bitcoins-characterizing-payments-among. 
 8.   See Bitcoin White Paper, supra note 5, at 1, 3; Liang J. Li L., Zeng D (2018) Evolutionary dynamics of 
cryptocurrency transaction networks: An empirical study, 1, and text accompanying note 5, PLoS One 13(8): 
e0202202, https:doi/org/10.1371/juornal.pone.0202202. 
 9.   Id. 
 10.   Id. 
 11.   Id. 
 12.   Jeff John Roberts, To Catch a Bitcoin Thief, Call These Detectives, FORTUNE (June 27, 2018), 
https://fortune.com/2018/06/27/bitcoin-detective-zcash-cryptocurrency/. 
 13.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Iran-Based Financial Facilitators of 
Malicious Cyber Activity and for the First Time Identifies Associated Digital Currency Addresses (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm556. 
 14.   Id. 
   15.   U.K. GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN 17–18 (2016), 
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authority to verify and authorize entries is distributed among the group of nodes designated 
for this purpose. These ledgers are decentralized by design. Their decentralization is 
considered to provide the trust proxy that legacy providers of record systems have long 
provided.16 Carla Reyes explains that distributed ledger technologies 
[use] the [distributed ledger technology or DLT] to refer generally to “computer 
software that is distributed, runs on peer-to-peer networks, and offers a 
transparent, verifiable, tamper-resistant transaction-management system 
maintained through a consensus mechanism rather than by a trusted third-party 
intermediary that guarantees execution.”17 
Finally, a “ledger” is just a system of records—a source of information or a place to 
store records.18 People have used ledgers since Biblical times.19  The bitcoin blockchain as 
with other distributed ledgers is the location of records that hold a series of increasingly long 
entries that show the chain of transactions involving a single unit (a bitcoin) and a storage 
system that is designed to be irreversible.20 The first entry in the ever-longer “addresses” on 
the blockchain stays with the later transactions.21  The second entry does as well.22  This 
allows observers to see how the bitcoin has moved through later transactions to the present 
day.  The retention of earlier transactions identifiers is comparable to the requirements of the 
“Travel Rule” that the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed on wire transfers in the 
1990’s.23 
Blockchains perform storage and vault-like protections for many commercial 
applications. They can replace legacy paper or digital records systems created and maintained 
by Federal or State agencies relating to who owns which parcels of land, who owns which 
motor vehicles or watercraft, who is the record owner of intellectual property, or who is the 
holder of bank or credit-card accounts.24  Such systems could be public and distributed as the 





 16.  Simon Gray, Blockchain Creates Open Finance System to Compete With Legacy Providers, TOOLBOX 
(Aug. 22, 2019), https://finance.toolbox.com/article/blockchain-creates-open-finance-system-to-compete-with-
legacy-providers. 
 17. Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373, 379-380 (2019); see also Carla 
L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Crypto Law, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 390-91 (2017) (“Distributed ledger technology 
(DLT) refers to computer software that is distributed, runs of peer-to-peer networks, and offers a transparent, 
verifiable, tamper-resistant transaction-management system maintained through a consensus mechanism”). 
 18.  Ledger, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ledger (last visited Mar. 10, 
2020). 
 19.  JP Fabri, LEDGER-NOMICS, BITEMYCOIN, https://bitemycoin.com/opinion/ledger-nomics/ (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2020) (“The first recorded ledgers were found in the city of Mesopotamia, today’s Iraq, around 7000 years 
ago.”). 
 20. See Bitcoin White Paper, supra note 5, at 1 (explaining a new electronic payment system to work based on 
“cryptographic proof . . . without the need for a trusted third party”). 
 21.  See generally id. at 3. 
 22.  Id. 
 23. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Cross-Border Electronic Transmittals of Funds, 75 Fed. Reg. 
60377, 60396 (2010) (including definitions originally codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.14). See Funds Transfer Rule, 31 
C.F.R. § 1010.100 (2018) (defining all terms for the statute). 
 24.  Greg Kaza, The Blockchain Revolution, 41 REG. 53, 54 (2018). 
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Ledgers like that undergirding Bitcoin also can help us follow supply chains and guard 
against counterfeit or “grey market” goods entering the marketplace in place of authorized, 
compliant, and wholesome goods.25  
Blockchain-recorded transactions have the added advantage of being non-reversible.26 
Blockchain transactions are one-way streets: no one can place a “stop-payment order” against 
a payment they initiated via a system using the bitcoin blockchain.27  The only way to get a 
refund or reversal of a transfer is to get the transferee to send a new message to the blockchain 
in favor of the transferor with the same value.28 The blockchain then shows both sides of the 
transaction—the in-bound and out-bound transactions.29 
B. Cryptocurrency 
The term “cryptocurrency” currently describes a class of digital assets that is not 
designated as legal tender by any national government.30 One reason for this framing is that 
when a national government designates a currency as legal tender and the currency comes 
into another government’s jurisdiction or is designated by counter parties to a transaction as 
the pertinent currency for satisfying obligations under contracts, the US government refers to 
that currency transaction as “foreign exchange.”31 The US government applies different 
standards to “foreign exchange” for purposes of taxation and regulation of intermediaries 
handling it.32 Currency that is regulated as “foreign exchange” is not “legal tender” under the 
Coinage Act of 1965.33 
Its early proponents viewed cryptocurrencies as market-based alternatives to the 
hegemony of financial services providers.34 Other proponents see it as a faster and less costly 
means of transferring ownership of assets that may either be digital or may be real-world 
assets.35  Yet others see cryptocurrencies as displacing the need for banks or other legacy 
 
 25.  Grey Market, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/grey-
market, (last visited Apr. 20, 2020). 
 26.  Bitcoin White Paper, supra note 5, at 1. 
 27.  See generally U.C.C. § 4-403 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019). 
 28.  Bitcoin White Paper, supra note 5, at 2. 
 29.  Id. 
 30. Contra 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (1983) (“United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and 
circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes 
and dues[.]”) I do not include cryptocurrencies such as El Petro offered by Venezuela’s state-controlled oil and 
natural gas company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., because it appears to be more in the nature of a security than of 
a currency. 
 31.  U.S. Foreign Exchange Intervention, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (May, 2007), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed44.html. 
 32. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(1) (2019) (defining a “dealer in foreign exchange” as “a person that accepts 
the currency, or other monetary instruments, funds, or other instruments denominated in the currency, of one or 
more countries in exchange for the currency, or other monetary instruments, funds, or other instruments 
denominated in the currency, of one or more other countries in an amount greater than $1,000 for any other person 
on any day in one or more transactions, whether or not for same-day delivery.”); see also I.R.C. §988 (2018) 
(defining “foreign currency” for purpose of taxing income from sources without the United States). 
 33. Contra 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2018) (stipulating that “United States coins and currency (including Federal 
reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks)” may legally pay debts, charges, 
taxes, and dues but  that “foreign gold or silver coins are not legal tenders for debts.”). Coinage Act of 1965, Pub. 
L. No. 89–81, § 79 Stat. 254, 255. 
 34. Bitcoin White Paper, supra note 5, at 1. 
 35.  See Dennis Ng & Paul Griffin, The Wider Impact of a National Cryptocurrency, GLOBAL POL. 1, 20 
(2018),  https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Ng%20and%20Griffin%20-
%20The%20Wider 
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providers of asset-storage or asset-transfer systems, including systems supporting remittances 
and other cross-border transfers.36 And some early inventors viewed cryptocurrencies as a 
means of reducing or eliminating the risk of “double spending” in digital environments.37 The 
range of potential uses includes faster and less costly cross-border payments and trade 
transactions, as well remittance payments.38  
International organizations and various governments have developed definitions of 
cryptocurrencies or “virtual currencies” to explain how they fit into their regulatory regimes.  
One of the earliest definitions is the G-20’s Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) 2014 
definition: 
Virtual currency is a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and 
functions as (1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a 
store of value, but does not have legal tender status (i.e., when tendered to a 
creditor, is a valid and legal offer of payment) in any jurisdiction. It is not issued 
or guaranteed by any jurisdiction, and fulfills the above functions only by 
agreement within the community of users of the virtual currency. Virtual currency 
is distinguished from fiat currency (i.e. “real currency,” “real money,” or “national 
currency”), which is the coin and paper money of a country that is designated as 
its legal tender; circulates; and is customarily used and accepted as a medium of 
exchange in the issuing country.  It is distinct from e-money, which is a digital 
representation of fiat currency used to electronically transfer value denominated 
in fiat currency.  E-money is a digital transfer mechanism for fiat currency—i.e., 
it electronically transfers value that has legal tender status.39  
In the United States, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) had 
issued its first guidance on cryptocurrencies in March 2013: 
“[V]irtual currency” is a medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some 
environments, but does not have all the attributes of real currency. In particular, 
virtual currency does not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction. . . .  
“convertible” virtual currency . . .  either has an equivalent value in real currency, 
or acts as a substitute for real currency.40 
 
%20Impact%20of%20a%20National%20Cryptocurrency.pdf (arguing that corporations may benefit by using 
cryptocurrency when transferring large amount of funds) (last visited Apr. 20, 2020). 
 36.  See Emilio R. Coello, Are Cryptocurrencies Useful for Remittances?, COIN CTR. (Jan. 6, 2020), 
https://coincenter.org/entry/are-cryptocurrencies-useful-for-remittances (explaining significantly lower costs to 
senders recipients and shorter delivery times of as little as 90 seconds compared with three to five days). 
 37.  See David Chaum, Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments, in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY - 
EUROCRYPT ‘98, (Kaisa Nyberg, ed., 1998), (explaining how blind signatures allow for untraceable payment 
systems and prevent against counterfeiting). 
 38.   See Christina Comben, How Ripple’s xRapid Could Improve Global Payments, COIN RIVET (Feb. 14, 
2019), https://coinrivet.com/how-ripples-xrapid-could-improve-global-payments/ (explaining how Ripple’s 
xRapid, a cryptocurrency, can improve remittances, cross-border transactions, and trade). 
 39.  FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES – KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL AML/CFT RISKS 
4 (2014), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-
aml-cft-risks.pdf [hereinafter FATF Definitions]. 
 40.  FIN. CRIMES ENF. NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001 APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S 
REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, 1 (Mar. 18, 2013), 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf [hereinafter FinCEN March 2013 Guidance]. 
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FinCEN’s March 2013 Guidance focused on persons that engage as a business in 
transactions involving exchange of cryptocurrency for real currency, funds, or other crypto 
currencies, or that issue and have authority to redeem or withdraw from circulation 
cryptocurrencies.41 This focus was appropriate because FinCEN was explicating how “virtual 
currencies” fit into its 2011 Guidance on responsibilities of “money transmitter[s]” and 
“provider[s] of prepaid access” under Treasury Department rulings.42 FinCEN updated the 
March 2013 Guidance and its intervening opinions on specific topics in May 2019 without 
changing the fundamentals of its 2013 Guidance.43 
For the moment, cryptocurrencies can be separated into the eight groupings discussed 
below.  These categories each contain unique features that pose national security risks. Some 
present very low risks, and others present higher risks, as I explain in Part IV of this article.  
1. Permissionless, decentralized and market-based. 
Since its introduction in 2009, Bitcoin has spurred the rise of cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin 
operates on a decentralized basis with verification and blockchain maintenance entrusted to 
a peer-to-peer network nodes.44 Bitcoin, as previously mentioned, is also permissionless and 
pseudo-anonymous.45 
On the downside, however, bitcoins are backed only by the blockchain and a market’s 
willingness to trust it.46  No hard assets or digital assets (other than the blockchain itself) stand 
behind bitcoins.47 
In a public, permissionless blockchain, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, all participants are 
theoretically equal.48 There is no central management or authority that can be compelled to 
report users’ data or keep records prescribed by a government other than those inherent to 
their business model, or even a central authority to respond to legal process.49 The exception 
to this “equality” principle is that some participants play key roles in validating transactions 
on the blockchain, including “miners” of bitcoins who perform verification and validation 
functions but are not known to all participants.50 However, their verification-and-validation 
roles do not necessarily make them persons susceptible to regulatory requirements or to 
subpoenas or other forms of legal process by governments or counterparties. 
Transactions on public blockchains are all open-to-view and relatable to each other in a 
chain because the “public key” is in fact public. The “private key” that is required to engage 
 
 41.  Id at 1–2. 
 42.  31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(4)–(5) (2019); 31 C.F.R. § 1022.420 (2019); Bank Secrecy Act Regulations—
Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Prepaid Access, 76 Fed. Reg. 45403, 45419 (July 29, 2011). 
 43.  FIN. CRIMES ENF. NET., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,  FIN-2019-G001 APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S 
REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 1 (May 9, 2019) 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2019-05/FinCEN%20Guidance%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf 
[hereinafter FinCEN Regulation Application]. 
 44.  Bitcoin White Paper, supra note 5, at 3, 8. 
 45.  Id. at 6. 
 46.  Id. at 1. 
 47.  John P. Kelleher, Why Do Bitcoins Have Value?, INVESTOPEDIA,  
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100314/why-do-bitcoins-have-value.asp (last updated Apr. 8, 2020). 
 48.  See Arnold Daniels, The Rise of Private Permissionless Blockchains — Part 1 (Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://medium.com/ltoneetwork/the-rise-of-private-blockchains-part-1-4c39bea2e2be (discussing the difference in 
accessibility between a public permissionless network and a private permissionless network). 
 49.  FinCEN Regulation Application, supra note 43, at 18. 
 50. Adam Chodorow, Bitcoin and the Definition of Foreign Currency, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 367, 373–74. 
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in transfers of these cryptocurrencies is private – not visible on the blockchain.51 Transactions 
are time-stamped and sequential.52 One can follow a chain of transfers from the first entry to 
the latest entry in time, and can ascribe to the last entry the status of being the “owner” or at 
least the custodian of the related crypto assets for the owner.53 It also is possible to follow 
transfers from the original public key address to others in the chain by comparing the relative 
lengths of the chains with similar initial addresses to the current “owner” or custodian.54 
2. Permissioned, centralized and linked to fiat currencies. 
Another form of cryptocurrencies is known as “stablecoins.”55  To reduce volatility in 
pricing, stablecoins should be backed by assets having values equal to the number of coins in 
circulation.56 These cryptocurrencies are centralized because some entity issues the units of 
currency against its reserves of the fiat currency or currencies to which the stablecoins are 
linked.57 Tether is an example of a stablecoin, despite the allegations over the past 18 months 
that the existing reserves do not support the number of Tether stablecoins in circulation.58  
A centralized manager has information about the intermediaries or owners of the coins 
because stablecoin holders theoretically have redemption rights to the underlying reserve fiat 
currency or other asset.59 One might also describe stablecoins as having values dependent on 
whatever “reserves” support the “stable” claim of stablecoin issuers.  Facebook’s Libra 
appears to be in the stablecoin category, but it has other attributes that I describe in 
subparagraph 6 of this Part, below.  
3. Public, Centrally Validated Blockchains 
EOS60 and Ripple61 are examples of public, permissioned blockchains. Some 
participants in this category of blockchains/cryptocurrencies are more equal than others,62 
 
 51.   J. ANTHONY MALONE, BITCOIN AND OTHER VIRTUAL CURRENCIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY lxxiv (2014). 
 52.   Eric D. Chason, How Bitcoin Function as Property Law, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 129, 167–71. 
 53.   WAYNER, supra note 6, 16–17. 
 54.   Id. 
 55.   Connor Blenkinsop, Stablecoins, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH, 
https://cointelegraph.com/explained/stablecoins-explained (last updated Apr. 30, 2019). 
 56.   Id. (“[I]f there are 500,000 USD-pegged coins in circulation, there should be at least $500,000 sitting in a 
bank.”). 
 57.     Id. 
 58.   Daniel Palmer &  Nikhilesh De, New York Attorney General Calls Bitfinex’s Legal Stance ‘Deeply 
Perverse’ in New Filing, Story from Policy & regulation,  COINDESK, (Dec. 13, 2019), 
https://www.coindesk.com/new-york-attorney-general-calls-bitfinexs-legal-stance-deeply-perverse-in-new-filing 
(“[Tether] . . . acknowledged in court that [it] was backed only by ‘cash and cash equivalents . . . representing 
approximately 74 percent of the current outstanding tethers.’” This suggested that Tether stablecoins were not fully 
backed). 
 59.   See 31 C.F.R. § 1022.420 (2019) (stating the recordkeeping requirements for providers of prepaid access 
to enable reconstruction of activation and later prepaid-related transactions). 
 60.   EOS.IO, https://eos.io/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) (EOS Worldwide, LLC and its Block.One 
operate blockchain protocols that can be private or public in their operations as businesses building on those 
systems select). 
 61.   RIPPLE LABS, INC., https://ripple.com/company/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) (stating Ripple’s native 
cryptocurrency is known as XRP). 
 62.   See Angela Walch, Univ. Coll. London Ctr. for Blockchain Techs., Intermediaries Who Must not be 
Named? The Keepers of the Public Blockchain, (Nov. 21, 2019) (unpublished draft paper presented at the Smart 
Regulation and the Future of Financial Services Public Policy Conference hosted by Antonin Scalia Law School 
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because the network appoints certain participants to hold privileges over others.63 These 
privileges include participating in running the node and keeping certain records, which are 
not powers shared by the general participants.64  
These privileges draw criticism for EOS, in part because the privileged, as of the time 
this article was published, were  concentrated in China.65 The centralization of validation in 
privilege holders on these networks may be sufficient to impose record-keeping and reporting 
of specific types of records of customers and transactions to government authorities or 
counter-parties in discovery or to respond to legal process.66  However, this may be difficult 
to achieve with offshore privileged participants.67  
A public, permissioned blockchain is one source of future public records systems, such 
as those for recording ownership of tangible property or providing public notice of security-
interest claims. 
4. Private, Permissionless Blockchains 
A private, permissionless blockchain has nodes that “will only acknowledge [other 
nodes’ existence], but not share any data” with them.68  
One attraction of the private, permissionless blockchains is that each “smart contract” 
that may be used “automatically creates a private (side-) chain associated with that contact.”69 
In addition, although a node may hold more than one “side-chain,” one node will not hold all 
of those in existence for the larger chain.70  
Each node still operates as a repository.71 Only designated persons or organizations get 
permission to read specific nodes; designated persons will require cryptographic signatures 
to gain access to reading.72 To have reading privileges, one needs both the unique identifier 
(address) and the URL of the node that has a copy of the smart contract and associated chain.73 
Also, each node will hold only data needed to service its own users—an “agent-centric” 
solution.74 These chains inside private chains make the task of ferreting out specific 
transactions more complicated because they are not visible to the those with a need to know.75  
 
and George Mason University) (on file with Professor Walch at awalch@stmarytx.edu) (delineating between 
varieties of blockchain system participants). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Flipside Crypto, Cryptocurrency in Focus: EOS Has Deep Pockets, but Faces Challenges Ahead, 
THESTREET (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/cryptocurrency/cryptocurrency-in-focus-eos-is-
loaded-with-ipo-cash-but-has-tough-job-ahead-15093676 [hereinafter Cryptocurrency in Focus] (reporting that 21 
delegates validate transactions, making EOS more centralized and that these delegates are concentrated in China). 
 66.  See generally TIMOTHY G. MASSAD, IT’S TIME TO STRENGTHEN THE REGULATION OF CRYPTO-ASSETS 
49–55 (2019),  
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Economis-Studies-Timothy-Massad-Cryptocurrency-
Paper.pdf. 
 67.  Id. at 47 (“In connection with closing the regulatory gap in this country, we would be wise to give the 
SEC and CFTC the ability to address the risks that offshore platforms pose to U.S. investors.”). 
 68.  Daniels, supra note 48. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See id. (“a single node holds multiple of ad-hoc chains, but never all of them”). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Daniels, supra note 48. 
 75.   Id. 
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In this respect, the ‘permissionless’ concept seems a stretch, but the main point is that access 
to information is not public in any form.  
These blockchains represent more powerful opportunities to hide assets because “smart 
contracts on these private networks, not only define who is allowed to perform contract 
actions but also who is allowed to read the contract and all related data.”76 First, the “smart 
contract” manages any contract actions required and created by this node, making it an ideal 
“location” from which to move those assets in the intermediate “layering” steps needed for 
traditional money laundering.77  Owners of crypto assets on private, permissionless 
blockchains are not likely to spend them outside a narrow sphere of prospective 
counterparties.78 This narrow sphere of prospective counterparties and the restrictions on 
permissions help protect the identities of users of these blockchains.  
Experimentation with private, permissionless blockchains has been limited.79 As of 
October 2018, one commentator, Arnold Daniels, had identified only three chains – the 
Holochain, LTO Network, and Monet. Holochain allows “users [to] share information peer-
to-peer on a need-to-know basis.”80 The LTO Network is Daniels’ own project: it “run[s] 
trustless workflows, targeting multinationals and governments . . . . The process has a strong 
focus on privacy and GDPR compliance.”81  
The last, as of February 2019, is Monet. Monet may be the most likely to be used to 
hide proceeds of financial crimes: it allows users to build “ad-hoc, short-lived chains, with 
mobile devices acting as nodes for the participants.”82   
Other crypto assets are in existence and development that will enhance privacy 
protections for users. One later entrant in this category is the LTO Network.83  Indeed, LTO 
Network states as a goal both keeping governments away and promoting compliance84 with 
the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).85 
5. Services and Applications that Allow “Mixing” of Bitcoins to Preserve More 
Privacy for Users 
“Mixing” or blending of transactions allows a Bitcoin user to transfer or transact with 
bitcoins and to have the details of the transaction deleted as soon as the transaction is 
complete.86 So that transactions are not linked to the in-bound bitcoins or prior transactions 
on that bitcoin chain, one or more units of Bitcoin enter the validation process to be “mixed” 
or “laund[ered]” with other bitcoins, and different bitcoins emerge.87 This process works like 
 
 76.   Id. 
 77.   See id. (explaining how one can use a “smart contract” to disguise criminal activity). 
 78.   See generally id. (noting the narrow scope of users on a single permissionless private network). 
 79.   Id. 
 80.   Daniels, supra note 48. 
 81.   Id. For more information on the GDPR, see Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection 
Regulation), OJ L 119, 04.05.2016 [hereinafter EU Regulation 2016/679]. The GDPR went into effect on May 25, 
2018. 
 82.   Daniels, supra note 48. 
 83.   See generally id. 
 84.   See generally id. 
 85.   EU Regulation 2016/679, supra note 81. 
 86.   Nine Best Bitcoin Mixers 2020, THEDARKWEBLINKS, https://www.thedarkweblinks.com/best-bitcoin-
mixer-services/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) [hereinafter Best Bitcoin Mixers 2020]. 
 87.   Id. 
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the stages of laundering “money.” First, the assets are “placed” into a deposit account, 
securities account, or hard assets with a legitimate entity.88 Then, in a process to separate the 
proceeds from the underlying crime called “layering,” the assets are moved around from one 
or more locations or through one or more person to others.89 Finally, the assets eventually 
emerge with the appearance of being clean—free from association with their origins.90 Fees 
charged for this bitcoin-mixer-laundry-style service vary considerably by service provider 
and the number of bitcoins being washed through the provider’s system.91   
6. The Libra: Facebook’s Cryptocurrency  
Facebook announced in June 2019 that it was preparing to launch a global currency built 
on a self-designed blockchain.92  The announcement described “a new decentralized 
blockchain, a low-volatility cryptocurrency, and a smart contract platform that together aim 
to create an new opportunity for responsible financial services innovation.93  Although 
professedly “decentralized,” Libra will be “governed by the Independent Libra Association 
tasked with evolving the ecosystem.”94 Libra has stablecoin features: it will be backed by a 
“basket of [assets]” designed to give each unit “intrinsic value.”95 The Libra Association has 
the purpose of “coordinat[ing] and provid[ing] a framework for governance for the network 
and reserve” with membership “formed from the network of validator nodes that operate the 
Libra Blockchain.”96 A separate entity, the Libra Reserve, is intended to hold and manage the 
assets underlying Libra towards low-volatility.97 
 
7. Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) 
Conversation about digital currencies issued by central banks has increased over the 
past year, particularly in France and Germany98 following the publication of Facebook’s plans 
for its Libra Cryptocurrency.99  The most recent development is a call for a Bank for 
International Settlements’ study of CBDCs.100 
 
 88.   Id. 
 89.   Id. 
 90.   U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING RISK ASSESSMENT, 2 n.1 (2015), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/National%20Money%20Laundering 
%20Risk%20Assessment%20%E2%80%93%2006-12-2015.pdf [hereinafter “NMLRA 2015”]. 
 91.   Nine Best Bitcoin Mixers 2020, supra note 86. 
 92.   Mike Issac and Nathaniel Popper, Facebook Plans Global Financial System Based on Cryptocurrency, 
NY TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/technology/facebook-cryptocurrency-libra.html. 
 93.   An Introduction to Libra: White Paper, LIBRA, https://libra.org/en-US/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2019 
/06/LibraWhitePaper_en_US.pdf (last updated Jan. 21, 2020) [hereinafter Libra White Paper]. 
 94.   Id. at 3. 
 95.   Id. at 3; see Jon Fingas, Facebook’s Libra Currency Will Get Half Its Backing from the US dollar, 
ENGADGET (Sept. 22, 2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019/09/22/facebook-libra-currency-backing/ (reporting 
that Facebook updated the basket of currencies it intended to include in the Libra Reserve). 
 96.   Libra White Paper, supra note 93, at 3–4. 
 97.   Christian Catalini et al., LIBRA, The Libra Reserve, https://libra.org/en-US/about-currency-
reserve/#the_reserve (describing intentions to fully back each coin “with a set of stable and liquid assets . . . users 
can have confidence that they will be able to sell any Libra coin at or close to the value of the reserve at any 
time.”). 
 98.   Bjarke Smith-Meyer, France and Germany Pledge to Fight Facebook’s Libra, POLITICO (Sept. 13, 
2019), https://www.politico.eu/article/france-and-germany-pledge-to-fight-facebooks-libra/ (maintaining that their 
governments “would combat any effort by [Facebook] to “claim monetary power”). 
 99.   See generally Libra White Paper, supra note 93. 
 100.   Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Central bank group to assess potential cases for central bank 
digital currencies (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.bis.org/press/p200121.htm. 
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Central bank digital currencies would not be “virtual currencies” under the definitions 
adopted by FATF in 2014101 or FinCEN in 2013102 because they would  
(a) qualify as “legal tender” in the jurisdictions whose central banks issue them; and  
(b) would be digital representations of fiat or real currency.103   
The term “central bank digital currency” in this taxonomy excludes the last category in 
this section of this paper—government-sponsored cryptocurrencies such as Venezuela’s 
Petro because, at least initially, such cryptocurrencies are not designated as “legal tender” by 
sponsoring governments.104   
8. Government-sponsored cryptocurrencies or other digital assets designed for 
disruptive effect 
This category of government-sponsored cryptocurrencies appears to be designed—at 
least initially—for limited types of transactions, such as purchases of oil or oil futures or for 
use only or primarily by off-shore persons.105  Because their announced raison d’etre is to 
evade sanctions or frustrate operations of normal reserve currencies, we may think of this 
category as being disruptors of a different dimension than Bitcoin. 
i. El Petro 
The most visible example of this disruptor category is “ El Petro,” the cryptocurrency 
issued by Venezuela’s state-run oil-and natural-gas company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 
(PDVSA).106  This cryptocurrency emerged in early 2018.107  
One of the stated purposes of El Petro is to enable the Maduro government to sell oil 
and evade economic sanctions placed on the Maduro government, PDVSA, and 
representatives of both by the United States.108 In March 2018, the Trump Administration 
imposed economic sanctions that barred US Citizens from purchasing Petros.109 Maduro 
government officials and officials of the PDVSA were named in that and subsequent rounds 
of economic sanctions.110 
 
 101.    FATF Definitions, supra note 39, at 4. 
 102.    FinCEN March 2013 Guidance, supra note 40, at 1. 
 103.    Id. 
 104.    Petro: Within 120 Days the Token Will Become Legal Tender for All Government Transactions, 
NEWSBTC (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.newsbtc.com/2018/04/12/petro-within-120-days-the-digital-token-will-
become-legal-tender-for-all-transactions-involving-government-institutions/. 
 105.    Thomas Meyer, Petro: Stable Coin for Crypto Economy or Illegal Oil Futures?, COINTELEGRAPH (Feb. 
22, 2018),  https://cointelegraph.com/news/petro-stable-coin-for-crypto-economy-or-illegal-oil-futures. 
 106.    Sam Meredith, Venezuela’s Oil-Backed Cryptocurrency More Likely to be Ruled ‘Illegitimate’ than 
Succeed, Economist Says, CNBC (Feb. 20, 2018),  https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/20/venezuelas-new-bitcoin-oil-
backed-cryprocurrency-launched-in-bid-to-save-economy.html. 
 107.    Samuel Haig, Venezuelan Petro Against US Sanctions: History and Use of the Crypto, COINTELEGRAPH 
(July 17, 2019),  https://cointelegraph.com/news/venezuelan-petro-against-us-sanctions-history-and-use-of-the-
crypto. 
 108.    Id. (providing a timeline of developments, including imposition of sanctions by President Trump, in El 
Petro from its announcement to July 2019). 
 109.    Id. (citing backing for El Petro as including diamond and gold reserves as well as oil and gas). 
 110.    E.g., Exec. Order No. 13827, 83 C.F.R. 12469 (2018) [hereinafter Executive Order 13827-Venezuela], 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-taking-additional-steps-address-situation-
venezuela/. 
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There is evidence that US sanctions have been working,111 a fact that portends more 
efforts to evade sanctions and may cause more allies to help the Maduro government and 
certain individuals against whom the President has imposed sanctions. 
Recently, the Maduro government has been encouraging broader internal uses of Petros, 
which has led to a surge in domestic person-to-person (“P2P”) uses and which has almost 
equaled the cryptocurrency penetration in the Russian Federation.112 More recently, the 
Maduro government is pushing for its people to use Petros to make everyday purchases.113 
P2P volumes in Venezuela are rising and, allegedly, are right behind Russia in cryptocurrency 
penetration.114 
To the extent that the Maduro government allows or encourages use of El Petro in 
domestic transactions, the government appears to be attempting to “regularize” El Petro as 
fiat currency or as CBDCs.115  That could lead to greater acceptance of Petros both in 
Venezuela’s domestic economy and as a medium for payments of oil and natural-gas 
purchases on a larger scale.   
ii. Russia and China and Plans for Gold-Backed Crypto 
Russia and China also have announced  plans to issue gold-backed cryptocurrencies for 
their own internal or external trade reasons.116 Another goal appears to be replacing the US 
Dollar as the world’s reserve currency.117 Russia has used cryptocurrencies such as the 
Venezuelan, government-owned Petro,118 which is specifically identified on the US Treasury 
Department’s “Specially Designated Nationals” (SDN) list,119 to help Venezuela evade US 
economic sanctions,120 and to assist Russia’s operations in Crimea.121  
 
 111.    See Rafeal Bernal, Trump Administration Imposes Venezuela Sanctions on Russian Company, THE HILL 
(Feb. 18, 2020), https://thehill.com/latino/483444-trump-administration-imposes-venezuela-sanctions-on-russian-
oil-company (discussing the impact of the US sanctions on Venezuela). 
 112.    Haig, supra note 107 (mentioning Maduro’s order in July 2019 to Venezuelan banks to accept Petros in 
their banking; useful timeline of the emergence). 
 113.    Id.; William Luther, Why is Maduro Still Pushing the Petro?, Am. Inst. Econ. Res. (Feb. 20, 2020), 
https://www.aier.org/article/why-is-maduro-pushing-the-petro (describing push by Maduro government for 
ordinary transactions because of “cash shortages”). 
 114.    Haig, supra note 107. 
 115.    Stephen O’Neal, Central Bank-Issued Digital Currencies: Why Governments May (or May Not) Need 
Them, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 25, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/central-bank-issued-digital-currencies-
why-governments-may-or-may-not-need-them. 
 116.    Daniel Palmer, Russian Central Bank to Consider Gold-Backed Cryptocurrency, COINDESK (May 23, 
2019), https://www.coindesk.com/russian-central-bank-to-consider-gold-backed-cryptocurrency; Sean Adl-
Tabatabai, Russia and China Roll Out 100% Gold-Backed Currency, NEWSPUNCH (Mar. 25, 2018), 
https://newspunch.com/russia-china-gold-backed-currency/. 
 117.    Adl-Tabatabai, supra note 116. 
 118.    See Sujha Sundararanajan, Venezuelan President Announces ‘Petro’ Oil-Backed Cryptocurrency, 
COINDESK (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/venezuelan-president-announces-petro-oil-backed-
cryptocurrency (describing the implementation of a cryptocurrency by the Venezuelan government). 
 119.    Executive Order 13827-Venezuela, supra note 111. See also Nikhilesh De, Trump Orders New 
Sanctions Against Venezuela’s Crypto, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/trump-orders-new-sanctions-
against-venezuelas-national-cryptocurrency (last updated Mar. 20, 2018) (elaborating on the Trump 
administration’s sanctions against Venezuela for Petro cryptocurrency). 
 120.    Simon Shuster, Exclusive: Russia Secretly Helped Venezuela Launch a Cryptocurrency to Evade US 
Sanctions, TIME (Mar. 20, 2018), https://time.com/5206835/exclusive-russia-petro-venezuela-cryptocurrency/. 
 121.    Helen Partz, Adviser to President of Russia Proposes Digital Currency in Crimea, COINTELEGRAPH 
(Apr. 22, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/adviser-to-president-of-russia-proposes-digital-currency-in-crimea 
(quoting Sergey Glazyev, who opined that the cryptocurrency was to reduce “cross-border barriers” and attract 
foreign investors who “are afraid of sanctions”). 
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The Putin government has spoken publicly of its intentions to create “official 
cryptocurrencies.”122 Russia’s announced purpose is to thwart economic sanctions imposed 
on Russian organizations and citizens.123 This puts the forthcoming Russian gold-reserves-
backed cryptocurrency both in the disruptor category in this paper’s taxonomy and in the 
reserves-backed category of cryptocurrencies. 
It is unclear whether governments such as Russia that sponsor cryptocurrencies will use 
their sovereign rights to deem their sponsored cryptocurrencies as “legal tender,” meaning a 
legal means to pay taxes and debts.124 It certainly appears that the Maduro government is 
moving in that direction with El Petro.  Some of these specialty cryptocurrencies, such as 
China’s current, external-only version of the yuan or renminbi, referred to as the CYH, are 
destined to operate only as an external currency, not for domestic purposes.125 It is unclear 
whether owners of these cryptocurrencies will be allowed to exchange it for rubles, yuan, or 
pesos, that is, for “real” domestically usable legal tender. What is clear, in the United States 
at least, is that when a foreign government declares a cryptocurrency “legal tender” for its 
own internal-domestic-market purposes, that currency will cease to be “virtual currency” as 
FinCEN has defined it126 and will become “foreign exchange.”127 Does this matter in the short-
term to the potential national security threats that these government-sponsored but not 
CBDCs may pose?  I deal with that question in Part IV of this article.  
II. CAN BLOCKCHAIN MAKE US SAFER? 
Turning now to the first of two questions for consideration: Can blockchain technologies 
make us safer? I have already stated that the answer is “yes.”  The more important questions 
are how and why blockchains may make us safer. This paper focuses on health care and life 
science applications as well as on supply-chain applications in food and pharmaceuticals. I 
previously mentioned but did not elaborate on this topic in my January 24, 2020 presentation 
on which this essay is based.   
 
 122.    See Rachel McIntosh, Oil-Backed Cryptocurrency Could Hit Russian Markets Soon, 
FINANCEMAGNATES (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/news/oil-backed-
cryptocurrency-could-hit-russian-markets-soon/ (detailing Russian government officials’ approval and plans for an 
oil-backed cryptocurrency). 
 123.    See Helen Partz, Russia’s Central Bank to Consider Gold-Backed Cryptocurrencies for Mutual 
Settlements, COINTELEGRAPH (May 23, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/russias-central-bank-to-consider-
gold-backed-cryptocurrencies-for-mutual-settlements (citing Elvira Nabiullina, head of the Russia Central Bank, 
giving testimony before the Duma). 
   124.    The Case of Mixed Money in Ireland, Trin. 2 James I. A.D. 1605, reprinted in 2 COBBETT’S COMPLETE 
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 114–130 (1809) (the earliest reported decision upholding the sovereign’s authority 
to make, change or debase its money and designate its choice as legal tender for payments of taxes and debts) 
[hereinafter The Case of Mixed Money]. For a recent discussion of U.S. methods thwarting competition to the 
dollar, see Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Substitutes for Legal Tender: Lessons from History for 
the Regulation of Virtual Currencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW (John A. 
Rothchild, ed., 2016). 
 125.    Jeremy Cook, Why Does China Have Two Currencies?, WORLDFIRST (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.worldfirst.com/uk/blog/international-business/foreign-exchange-international-business/china-two-
currencies/. 
 126.    FinCEN March 2013 Guidance, supra note 40. 
 127.     Id. 
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A. Blockchain technologies are designed to be tamper-resistant.  
Although many experts talk about blockchains being “immutable,”128 it is preferable to 
think of blockchains as being “tamper-resistant.”129 To be more precise, “blockchain” 
technologies – distributed ledger technology (DLT)– offer a larger set of technologies that 
are engineered to have certain properties.130  Professor Carla Reyes offered one of clearest 
and simplest descriptions of DLTs: 
[T]he term distributed ledger technology (DLT) . . . refer[s] generally to 
“computer software that is distributed, runs on peer-to-peer networks, and offers 
a transparent, verifiable, tamper-resistant transaction-management system 
maintained through a consensus mechanism rather than by a trusted third-party 
intermediary that guarantees execution.”131 
Building on this definition, there are a few key attributes associated with DLTs that can 
make us safer, including: 
• transparency in transactions,  
• verifiable transactions, 
• consensus mechanism as a governance principle,  
• peer-to-peer networks, and 
• no third-party intermediary to introduce cyber-threats or to be the focus of 
hacking attempts, or fewer opportunities for effective cyber-hacks of the 
blockchain. 
 
Among the fields in which blockchain technologies are expected to produce gains in 
safety are healthcare and life sciences.  The major areas of predicted utility, some of which 
will need to be private, permissioned blockchains, include: 
• Electronic health records systems, 132  
• Enabling sharing aggregate patient data with privacy protections for patient-
level data that can serve larger population studies instead of patient-level 
data,133  
• Limitation of single-point of failure episodes,134  
 
 128.    E.g., Dr. Garrick Hileman & Michel Rauchs, Global Blockchain Benchmarking Study, CAMBRIDGE CTR. 
FOR ALTERNATIVE FIN. 17 (2017), https://cdn.crowdfundinsider.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2017-Global-
Blockchain-Benchmarking-Study_Hileman.pdf (debunking common “blockchain myths”—one of which is 
immutability or tamper-proof status, noting that network participants actually can reverse transactions under 
specific circumstances). 
 129.    Carla L. Reyes, Cryptolaw for Distributed Ledger Technologies: A Jurisprudential Framework, 58 
JURIMETRICS J. 283, 285 (2018). 
 130.    Id. 
 131.    Id. (citing ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGY: A 
COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2016)). 
 132.    See generally Tim Mackey, et al., ‘Fit-For-Purpose?’ Challenges and Opportunities for Applications of 
Blockchain Technology in the Future of Healthcare, BMC MED. (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916-019-1296-7 (containing particularly enlightening 
tables and charts of use cases). 
 133.    Id. 
 134.    Id. 
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• Increases in compliance with regulatory requirements or internal risk-control 
protocols,135 
• Lowering certain costs through automation, removing intermediaries, or 
reducing administrative burdens,136 
• Fraud prevention,137 
• Credentialing and licensing of medical professionals,138 and  
• Clinical trial management.139 
 
Since my January 24, 2020 presentation, we can expand the utility of the second item on the 
list above: this utility may offer benefits in tracking the spread of infectious diseases, such 
as the Covid-19 virus, and of contagious diseases.  Blockchains may assist us in performing 
studies on the effectiveness of therapies and of engaging in contract tracing.   
B. Blockchain technologies can contribute to safer supply chains, including chains 
that show origins of foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals. 
Because of their general tamper-proof status and of the ability to design private and 
permissioned blockchain applications, as described in Part II of this essay, blockchains can 
help protect supply chains in food and pharmaceuticals.  With respect to food, blockchains 
can help us determine the origins of specific batches of food stuffs—namely, whether batches 
were produced domestically or not.140 With the added reliability of blockchain technologies, 
this information can help public-health officials trace back to specific deliveries if a 
contaminant is detected. For example, this technology could have assisted in discovering 
Listeriosis in pre-sliced meats and cheeses in 2019 and E. coli bacteria in the notorious 1993 
Jack-in-the-Box hamburger episode.141 
Sourcing and origins of pharmaceuticals are not second-in-fact in the benefits that may 
flow to the public from blockchain record-keeping.  The presence of counterfeit components 
and useless pharmaceuticals in the pharmaceutical supply chains are sources of significant 
concerns.  Examples of these problems include drugs with no active ingredients, those with 
the wrong or counterfeit ingredients, and those with the wrong dose of correct active 
ingredients.142 
 
 135.    Id. 
 136.    Id. 
 137.    Id. 
 138.    Mackey et al., supra note 132. 
 139.    Id. at 6–9. 
   140.    Jenny Splitter, What Can Blockchain Really Do For The Food Industry, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennysplitter/2018/09/30/what-can-blockchain-really-do-for-the-food-
industry/#4998b4cc488e. 
 141.    See U.S. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROLS & PREVENTIONS, Outbreak of Listeria Infections Linked to Deli-
Sliced Meats and Cheese, (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/deliproducts-04-19/index.html 
(reporting that Listeria outbreak was linked to food supplies); Jack-in-the-Box E. Coli Outbreak Lawsuits – 
Western States (1993),  MARLER CLARKE (Apr. 1, 2008),  https://marlerclark.com/news_events/jack-in-the-box-e-
coli-outbreak-western-states  (reporting that hamburger patties served in 73 Jack-in-the-Box restaurants caused E. 
coli infections across several states). 
 142.    See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Counterfeit Medicine (Sept. 13, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/buying-using-medicine-safely/counterfeit-medicine (explaining what counterfeit 
medicine is). 
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III. WILL CRYPTOCURRENCIES MAKE US LESS SAFE? IF SO, WHY? 
First, let me state that I do not believe that all cryptocurrencies make us safer.  Second, 
I do not believe that all cryptocurrencies make all of us less safe.  So, it is important to describe 
“safer” and “less safe” in this context and to explain what factors, features, or arrangements 
may make persons in the United States less safe than they otherwise might be and what I 
mean by “safer” or “less safe.”  It also is important to appreciate that these are complicated 
questions because privacy is an important protection for activists and journalists, especially 
in non-rule-of-law jurisdictions. Cryptocurrency transfers can provide privacy protections. 
Finally, it is important to identify the spheres in which cryptocurrencies pose risks to safety 
that are different from legacy, intermediated payments, and payments services. 
In highlighting three types of risks in this section, I do not mean to belittle the 
contributions that well-governed cryptocurrencies and real blockchains can make to 
economies, trade, and global remittances—the contributions are real.  They include potential 
expansion of financial inclusion, faster delivery of trade payments and remittances, and less 
costly delivery of payments domestically and internationally.   
The three topics I mention in this section may not be in the order in which the specific 
issues will emerge. The purpose is to begin to identify types of risks that may emerge. In my 
concluding remarks, I mention other topics where my own research may apply, and as a 
means of encouraging others to look at the same issues. 
A. Risks to “monetary sovereignty”  
During the March 1, 2019 Roundtable on the Future of Financial Regulation hosted by 
George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School, I raised my concern that state-
sponsored cryptocurrencies could threaten national security because—taken to their logical 
endpoints—cryptocurrencies challenge the ability of governments to prescribe “legal tender”  
and, for that reason, to protect national governments’ “monetary sovereignty.”143 I made that 
comment before Facebook announced its intention to launch its Libra cryptocurrency.144   
The connection to concerns about “monetary sovereignty” appear to be animating the 
objections of governments, such as those in France and Germany—whose finance ministers 
declared in September 2019 that “[n]o private entity can claim monetary power, which is 
inherent to the sovereignty of nations.”145 This sentiment is in accord with the outcome of The 
Case of Mixed Money in Ireland, the 1605 decision upholding the authority of the English 
sovereign, Queen Elizabeth I to fix the currency and its value within that sovereign’s 
domain.146 (Despite more than 400 years old, the opinion in Mixed Money explains so much 
about governments’ insistence on controlling “legal tender.”) 
To see one of the logical outgrowths of state-sponsored cryptocurrencies such as El 
Petro, we can look to the consultation request filed by the Maduro government in Venezuela 
against the United States in the World Trade Organization in late 2018.147  Maduro’s 
 
 143.   Sarah Jane Hughes, Remarks at the Roundtable on the Future of Financial Regulation at the Antonin 
Scalia Law School (Mar. 1, 2019). 
 144.   See Julia Boorstein, Facebook Launches a New Cryptocurrency Called Libra, CNBC (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/17/facebook-announces-libra-digital-currency-calibra-digital-wallet.html 
(announcing Libra after my talk in March). 
 145.   Smith-Meyer, supra note 98, at 1. 
 146.   The Case of Mixed Money, supra note 124. 
 147.   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, WTO, (1994) [hereinafter GATT]. 
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complaint cited violations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (GATT)148 
and General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) obligations occasioned by Executive 
Order 13,827 and other actions taken by the United States against El Petro.149 More 
specifically, the Maduro Government charged that the United States was violating GATS 
Article II Section 1.  That Article provides that no member will treat another member less 
favorably than any other nation.150 Exceptions to WTO obligations arise if the member 
maintains that their actions relate to “essential security interests.”151 Executive Order 13827 
explicitly references a prior declaration of a national emergency by the United States against 
Venezuela—Executive Order 13692 of March 8, 2015152 and Executive Order 13808 of 
August 24, 2017.153  As of July 1, 2020, there had been no progress to the appointment of the 
panel to hear Venezuela’s complaint.154 President Trump’s Executive Orders against El Petro 
and its government-operated company sponsor, PDVSA, prohibited “U.S. persons” from 
transactions “related to, provi[ding] financing for, and other dealings in” digital currency, 
coins or tokens “issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela on or after 
January 9, 2018 . . . .”155 The President’s sanctions order reached “any digital currency, digital 
coin, or digital token, that was issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela 
on or after January 9, 2018 . . . .”156 The President’s anti-Petro Executive Order cited the 
President’s authority to deny access to U.S. markets if the purpose—such as evading 
economic sanctions—is “unlawful.” 157 
Other examples showing that cryptocurrencies are designed to enable governments to 
evade sanctions come from Iran and Russia.158 Beyond that, we see evidence that governments 
aid each other in avoiding sanctions.159 Others believe that cryptocurrencies generally may 
diminish the effectiveness of sanctions.160 A decrease in national governments’ monetary 
policy or control capacities because of an increase in assets placed in cryptocurrencies could 
decrease the dollar or other reserve currencies that central banks use to respond to crises of 
 
 148.    Id. 
 149.    Request for Consultations by Venezuela, United States−Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and 
Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS574/1 (Aug. 1, 2019); See also Tom Miles, Venezuela Launches WTO challenge to 
U.S. Sanctions, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-venezuela-sanctions-
wto/venezuela-launches-wto-challenge-to-u-s-sanctions-idUSKCN1P21L6 (discussing Venezuela’s complaint 
further). 
 150.    General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS]. 
 151.     GATT art. XXI. For discussion of how the WTO signatories expected Article XXI to be interpreted, see 
GATT, ‘Analytical Index, Note by the Executive Secretary’ (MGT/61/52, June 1952). 
 152.    Exec. Order No. 13,692, 3 C.F.R. 12692 (2015-2016). 
 153.    Exec. Order No. 13,808, 3 Fed. Reg. 41155 (2017). 
 154.     United States−Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, World Trade Organization, WTO 
DS574 (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds574_e.htm (reporting that 
Venezuela’s request for a panel hearing is pending). 
 155.    Exec. Order No. 13827-Venezuela, supra note 110. 
 156.    Id. 
 157.    Id. at preamble. 
 158.    See Manshee Joshi, Iran Proposes Use of Cryptocurrency to Elude Sanctions, CRYPTOPOLITAN (Feb. 27, 
2020), https://www.cryptopolitan.com/irans-use-of-cryptocurrency/ (reviewing numerous efforts to bring “mining” 
and investments to Iran, and the use of resulting cryptocurrencies to evade U.S. sanctions). 
 159.    See Shuster, supra note 121 (outlining Russia’s encouragement of Venezuela avoidance of US 
sanctions). 
 160.    Keith Johnson & Elias Groll, U.S. Sanctions Weapon Is Under Threat - but Not from Bitcoin, FOREIGN 
POL. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/24/u-s-sanctions-weapon-under-threat-but-not-from-
bitcoin-blockchain-dlt-petro/. 
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national, regional, or international dimensions.161 The Bank for International Settlements has 
commented on monetary sovereignty risks from cryptocurrencies.162 
“Monetary policy” capacity enables governments to control inflation and spur economic 
growth.163  Use of monetary policy tools such as those that the Federal Reserve System 
deployed during the 2008–2009 financial crisis both in favor of U.S.-based depository 
institutions and global institutions enabled its program of “qualitative easing” of the economy 
through its discount-window lending and other measures.164 
B. Concerns about cryptocurrencies’ roles in money laundering and  
terrorist financing 
Concerns about the uses of cryptocurrencies as tools in money laundering and terrorist 
financing caused the G20 to urge member states to adopt regulations compelling 
cryptocurrency exchanges to collect customer information.165 The Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Treasury noted that Libra could be “misused by money launderers and terrorist 
financers.”166 
C. Deposit volatility – enabling runs and panics in crypto and traditional depository 
institutions ─ and enabling fraud and theft 
Cryptocurrencies, given the speed at which transfers can be settled compared with 
legacy bank transfers, also enhance risks associated with rapid movements of values from 
nation to nation and could contribute to broader instability in world markets and national 
economies. Use of crypto assets to either avoid national securities regulatory regimes or to 
engage in market manipulation is also worrisome.167 The February 2020 G20 attendees also 
called for measures to handle consumer and investor protection, following the more than 
$4.26 billion in cryptocurrency holdings lost to fraud and theft in the first half of 2019.168 
 
 161.     Id. 
 162.     Bank for Int’l Settlements, COMM’N ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, G7 Working Group on 
Stablecoins, Investigating the Impact of Global Stablecoins, CPMI Papers No. 187, iii (Oct. 18, 2019), 
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 163.    See Monetary Policy Principles and Practice, FED. RESERVE BOARD (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/monetary-policy-what-are-its-goals-how-does-it-work.htm (“In the 
broadest terms, monetary policy works by spurring or restraining growth of overall demand for goods and 
services in the economy.”). 
 164.    Id. 
 165.   Gregory Lisa & Hogan Lovells, G20 Calls on Countries to Adopt FATF Crypto Standards, JD SUPRA 
(Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/g20-calls-on-countries-to-adopt-fatf-41765/ (referencing the 
June 2019 FATF Guidelines on cryptocurrencies and the “travel rule” adopted then to require “virtual asset service 
providers” to collect such information). See also Smith-Meyer, supra note 98, at 2 (describing July 2019 concerns 
about these topics by G7 finance ministers). 
 166.     White House Press Briefing by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin on Regulatory Issues Associated 
with Cryptocurrency, US DEPT. OF TREASURY (July 15, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-
releases/sm731. 
 167.     See generally, Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, Jr., The SEC & The Internet: Regulating 
the Web of Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 262 (2014). 
 168.     Tom Zanki, G20 Wants Countries To Implement Strict Crypto Rules, LAW360 (Feb. 24, 2020), 
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CONCLUSION 
In this essay, I asked and began to answer two questions.  The first focused on whether 
blockchains could provide safer environments for supply chains and beyond.  In response, I 
argue that blockchains generally can increase our collective safety in certain ways.  I focus 
on supply-chains for food and pharmaceuticals and the manner that blockchain, can protect 
the integrity of information about contents, providers, and purchasers, I note that supply 
chains can be retraced if problems arise.  Additionally, I note that the primary issue with 
blockchains in this respect is that, if the information sent to the block is garbage, then the 
information available later will be no better than garbage.  This is a challenge that blockchain 
technology tries to address. However, despite considerable optimism that it can, we do not 
yet know how successfully it meets this challenge.   
The tamper-resistant features of permissionless blockchains provide greater protections 
from hacking and theft generally and security in the integrity of data from interference by bad 
actors.  Data integrity and data resilience are key aspects of secure supply chains for 
foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, and other important manufactured goods and commodities. They 
also matter enormously in safe-and-sound financial services and to national security. 
With the second question I asked, will cryptocurrencies make us less safe? Despite 
longstanding interests in faster and less costly forms of payment products, I see some of the 
developments in cryptocurrencies as making individuals less safe for the reasons I have laid 
out in Part IV of this essay.  That does not mean that we cannot avoid increased or increasing 
risks if we act soon and also if we act in concert with other national governments and 
international organizations such as the G-7, G-20, and the European Union. One of the means 
of containing some of the risks that cryptocurrencies may pose to individuals and institutions 
is to do as the United States, the European Union, and the G-20’s Financial Action Task Force 
are endeavoring to do, which is to  place responsibilities on gatekeepers or the entities that 
FATF calls “virtual asset service providers” (VASPs).169 How or why do some of the 
cryptocurrencies cause or contribute to national security risks as I have described them above? 
In addition to the three, top-level concerns that I discuss in Part IV, I have identified the 
following as issues which demand the attention of scholars: 
• Will pseudo-anonymous cryptocurrency transactions cause governments and supply-
chain financers a loss of information about trade balances and possibly about trade 
occurrences? 
• Will pseudo-anonymous cryptocurrency transactions cause business and consumers to 
lose demand deposit features common in commercial banking or assured redemption rights 
to values transferred in exchange for cryptocurrencies? 
• Will cryptocurrency transactions weakening governments’ ability to track transactions 
for tax purposes? Will this weaken governments generally – even as much as individuals 
might like it? 
• How will businesses and governments manage the loss of government-provided 
deposit insurance if a cryptocurrency provider fails? Can we fund a new program that ensures 
speedy resumption of access to deposits when non-insured financial services providers or 
VASPs fail?  How will we manage the potential for disruption to the economy as businesses 
and consumers lack access to enough fiat currency or fiat-associated deposits to meet their 
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daily needs including payroll? Lengthy delays are not fictional. Mt. Gox and Quadriga FX 
customers are waiting for access to their assets today.  
• What types of anti-fraud and anti-market manipulation tools will we need to manage 
different types of service providers than those currently regulated in the U.S. and elsewhere?  
These questions are the topics that need future exploration as cryptocurrencies and other 
blockchain technologies come into wider adoption.  
